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Verifiable by Public Key 
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Abstract.  Signcryption, first proposed by Zheng [4, 5], is a crypto- 
graphic primitive which combines both the functions of digital signa- 
ture and public key encryption in a logical single step, and with a com- 
putational cost siginficantly lower than that needed by the traditional 
signature-then-encryption approach. In Zheng's scheme, the signature 
verification can be done either by the recipient directly (using his pri- 
vate key) or by engaging a zero-knowledge interative protocol with a 
third party, without disclosing recipient's private key. In this note, we 
modify Zheng's cheme so that the recipient's private key is no longer 
needed in signature verification. The computational cost of the modified 
scheme is higher than that of Zheng's cheme but lower than that of the 
signature-t hen-encryption approach. 
1 In t roduct ion  
To guarantee unforgibility, integrity and confidentiality of communications, the 
traditional method is to digitally sign a message then followed by public key 
encryption. Signcryption, first proposed by Zheng [4], is a new cryptographic 
primitive which simultaneously fulfills both the functions of signature and en- 
cryption in a single logical step, and with a computational cost significantly 
lower than that required by the traditional signature-then-encryption approach. 
Two types of signcryption schemes were studied in [4], one based on the E1Ga- 
mal type of public key cryptosystems and the other on RSA. In this note, we 
only consider signcryption schemes based on the E1Gamal type of public key 
cryptosystems. 
In the signature-then-encryption approach using DSA for signature and the 
E1Gamal public key cryptosysem for encryption, a total of 6 exponential com- 
putations are required: one for signature generation, two for encryption, one 
for decryption, and two for signature verification. Zheng's igncryption scheme 
needs only a total of 3 exponential computations: one for signcrypting and two 
for unsigncrypting. 
In the traditional signature-then-encryption approach, the message and the 
sender's ignature are obtained after the decryption by using the recipient's pri- 
vate key. The signature is then verified using only the sender's public key. Hence, 
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the validity of the signature can be checked by anyone who has knowledge of the 
sender's public key. In the signcryption scheme of [4], the unsigncryption (de- 
cryption and signature verification) needs the recipient's private key; therefore, 
only the recipient can verify the signature. As pointed out in [5], the constraint 
of using the recipient's private key in unsigncryption is acceptable for certain 
applications where the recipient need not pass the signature to others for veri- 
fication; however, Zheng's ingcryption schemes can not be used in applications 
where a signature need to be validated by a third party only using the public 
key as in usual signature scheme. To overcome this problem, some methods are 
given in [5] by introducing an independent judge. That is done by proving the 
equality of discrete logarithms. However, [2] points out that the confidentiality 
is lost in this case. 
In this note, we modify Zheng's signcryption scheme such that verification 
of a signature no longer needs the recipient's private key. Hence, the modified 
scheme functions in exactly the same manner as that of the signature-then- 
encryption approach. However, the modified scheme is not as efficient as Zheng's 
original scheme. Nevertheless, the modified scheme is still more computational 
efficient han the signature-then-encryption approach. 
2 Zheng 's  Scheme 
Task: Alice has a message m to send to Bob. Alice signcrypts m so that the 
effect is similar to signature-then-encryption. 
Pub l i c  Parameters  
9 p: a large prime. 
9 q: a large prime factor of p - 1. 
9 g: an element of Z; of order q. 
9 hash: a one-way hash function. 
9 KH:  a keyed one-way hash function. 
9 (E, D): the encryption and decryption algorithms of a symmetric key ci- 
pher. 
Alice's keys 
9 xa: Alice's private key, xa E Z~. 
9 y~: Alice's public key, y~ = g=- mod p. 
Bob's  keys 
9 Xb: Bob's private key, Xb E Z~. 
9 Yb: Bob's public key, Yb = g=b rood p. 
Signcrypting: 
Alice randomly chooses z ER Z~, then sets 
(kl, k2) = hash(y~ mod p) 
c = Ek, (m) 
r = gHk2 (m) 
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s = x / ( r  + x~) rood q 
Alice sends (c, r, s) to Bob. 
Unsigncrypting: 
Bob computes 
(kl, k2) = hash((yagr) "z~ mod p) 
m = Dk~ (c) to recover the plaintext message, 
and then checks whether KHk2 (m) = r for signature verification. 
In [4], two singcryption schemes were given, called SDSS1 and SDSS2. Here we 
only describe the case for SDSS1. The case for SDSS2 is similar. In Zheng's 
unsigncrypt ing process, it is straightforward to see that Xb is involved for 
signature verification. 
3 The  Modi f ied  S ingcrypt ion  Scheme 
Using the same set of notations as in the last section for public parameters, 
Alice's key and Bob's keys, the modified scheme is described as follows: 
Signcrypting: 
Alice randomly chooses x ER Zq, then sets 
kl --- hash(y~ rood p), 
k2 = hash(g ~ mod p) 
c = Ek, (m) 
r =/~g~2('n) 
s = z / ( r  + za) mod q. 
Alice sends (c, r, s) to Bob. 
Unsigncrypting: 
Bob computes 
tl = (yagr) s rood p 
t2 = t~ ~ rood p 
kl = hash(t2) 
k2 = hash(t1) 
m = Dk, (c) to obtain the plaintext message, 
then checks whether KHk2 (m) = r for signature verification. 
Later when necessary, Bob may forward (m, r, s) to others, who can be convinced 
that it came originally from Alice by verifying 
k = hash((yagr) a mod p) and r = KHk(rn)  
Actually, we can use hash to replace the keyed hash function KH.  In that case, 
the modified scheme can be written as follows: 
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Modi f ied  Scheme 
S igncrypt ing:  
Alice randomly chooses x ER Zq, then sets 
tl = gX mod p 
t2 -- y~ mod p 
c -~ Ehashr 
r = hash(m,  tl) 
s = x / ( r  -I- xa) mod q 
Alice sends (c, r, s) to Bob. 
Uns igncrypt ing :  
Bob computes 
t l  = (yagr)" mod p 
t2 = t~ ~ rood p 
m -~ Dha,h(t2) (C), 
then checks whether  = hash(m,  t l ) .  
Bob may pass (m, r, s) to others, who can be convinced that it indeed came from 
Alice by verifying 
r = hash(m,  (yagr) ") 
4 D iscuss ion  
Discuss ion  on Computat ion  Cost  
In the comparison of computation costs, we assume that the exponential 
computation is the most time consuming while the computation time for hash  
and (E, D) can be ignored. Under this assumption, the modified scheme requires 
a total of 5 exponential computations instead of 6 as in the traditional signature- 
then-encryption method. At the same time, it achieves exactly the same effect as 
in signature-then-encryption. That is, after receiving (c,r, s), Bob first obtains 
the plaintext message m using his private key. Now Bob has Alice's signature 
(m, r, s). This signature can be verified by anyone using only Alice's public key. 
Discuss ion  on  Secur i ty  
The security of the modified scheme is the same as that of the original scheme. 
1. Unforgeability - it is computationally infeasible for an adaptive attacker 
to masquerade in creating a signcrypted text. 
2. Non-repudiation - it is computationally feasible for a third party to settle 
a dispute between Alice and Bob in an event where Alice denies that she is the 
originator of a signcrypted text. 
Both the unforgeability and non-repudiation are based on the assumption that 
it is computationally infeasible to forge (m, r, s)(without knowing xa) such that 
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r = hash(m, (yagr)8), which is the security basis for SDSS1. It should be noted 
that the same assumption is made in the Schnorr signature scheme [3]. 
3. Confidentiality - - It is computationally infeasible for an adaptive attacker 
to gain any information on the contents of a signcrypted text. Here, as in any 
public key cryptosystems, we assume that Iml is large enough to resist brute 
force attack from r = hash(m, (yagr)s). 
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